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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 




SEAGULL ENTERPRISES, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, SHIRLEY 
K. WATSON, UNITED BANK, a 
Utah Corporation, ZIONS FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK and MURRAY 
















BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
CASE NO. 
15641 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Summary Judgment granted by 
the Honorable David B. Dee, Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and entered 
in the above entitled matter on the 2nd day of November, 1977. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant Seagull Enterprises, Inc., a Utah corporation, 
hereinafter referred to as "Seagull", Shirley K. Waton, hereinafter 
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referred to as "Watson", and Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc. 
hereinafter referred to as "MBC", seek a reversal of the 
SUillIIlary Judgment and a remand of the above entitled matter to 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah for a full trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In February of 1974, Mr. Jay Gardner, hereinafter 
referred to as "Gardner", as the General Manager of radio star: 
K.."10R, hereinafter referred to as the "Station", located in Sal: 
Lake County, Utah, met in California with Mr. Charles R. S~dle: 
to discuss the possible acquisition by Mr. Sadler of certain 
- ------------
pr op er ties of the Station (R. 296). Aft~~r~ -Sadler 1 s-initia: 
indication of interest to Gardner, a meeting was arranged bee:< 
Mr. Sadler and the owner of the station properties, Mr. 0. J. 
Wilkinson (R.297). 
After the proposed purchase negotiations had proceedec 
to a point where the acquisition seemed imminent, in March of 
1974, Seagull Enterprises, Inc., hereinafter "Seagull" was 
incorporated to acquire from Mr. O. J. Wilkinson certain real 
property and broadcast equipment together with the Federal 
Co=unication Colillllission broadcasting license and operate the 
Station (R. 297). Mr. Sadler was president and majority stock~. 
··~ 
· d nt an: 
of Seagull, and Mr. Gardner was to serve as vice presi e 
~-----------......._ 
general manager (R.294, 295). 
On the 26th day of June, 1974, two agreements were 
2 
• 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
executed by and between O.J.Wilkinson, d/b/a KMOR Radio 
and Seagull. The first Purchase Agreement related to certain 
real property located in Salt Lake County and provided for a 
purchase price of $250,000.00 with a $5,000.00 down payment to 
be paid at the time the Federal Communications Commission, herein-
after "Commission", approved the transfer of the broadcasting 
license from Mr. Wilkinson to Seagull with the balance of 
$245,000.00 to be paid in monthly installments of $2,484.96 com-
mencing the first day of the second month following said Commis-
sion approval. (R.9-14). The other Purchase Agreement related to 
the broadcasting license identified as FCC File No. BR2198, 
together with certain broadcasting equipment and provided for a 
total consideration of $250,000.00 with $74,000.00 to be placed 
in escrow and payable to the seller fifteen days after Commission 
approval of the agreement, and transfer of the broadcasting license 
from Mr. O.J. Wilkinson to Seagull with the balance of $176,000.00 
to be paid in monthly installments of $1,785.11 commencing on the 
first day of the sixth month following said Commission approval. 
(R. 15-21). 
An application for approval of the assignment and transfer 
of the broadcast license from Mr. O.J. Wilkinson to Seagull 
was prepared and filed with the Commission and, on December 13, 
1974, the Commission approved the transfer (R. 301) whereupon 
Seagull paid to Mr. Q. J. lvilkinson the sum of $ 5, 000. 00 
as required by the Purchase Agreement relating to the real property 
and the sum of $74,000.00 that was being held in escrow pending 
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Commission approval was released from and pajd by the escrow 
to Mr. Wilkinson (R.301). 
Because of certain financial difficulties, Seagull 
was unable to comply with the monthly installment payment 
provisions of either agreement and on the 4th day of September, 
1975, Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson caused to be served on Gardner two 
documents, each entitled Notice, whereby Mr. Wilkinson sought t 
declare a forfeiture by Seagull in and to both agreements (R.31 
R. 358-362). Shortly thereafter, Gardner left the station and 
took employment in Wyoming (R. 310). However, in January of 19" 
Gardner had several telephone conversations with both Mr. Wilk: 
and Mr. Sadler, each of whom assured Gardner that Seagull was 
going forward and that the contractural obligations would be 
met (R. 310). Based on these assurances and representations, 
Gardner returned as general manager of radio station KMOR on 
January 29, 1976 (R.311). 
Financial problems continued to plague Seagull and in 
February, March and April of 1976, Mr. Sadler, for and on beha: 
of Seagull, attempted to negotiate a transfer of the broadcast 
license from Seagull to the respondent herein Mr. Tim Themy. 
The transfer price was to be $13,000.00 but the negotiations 
were never consummated (R.332). 
Meanwhile, on March 1, 1976, Mr. O. J. Wilkinson exec•; 
a promissory note in favor of k 
. thi 
Zions First National Ban in 
amount of $250,000.00 (R.92). h f Mr To secure payment t ereo · 
to Z]_. ons Fi" rs t National Bank 
3 
Wilkinson signed and delivered 
4 b 
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Deed of Trust in and to the same real property subject to the 
Wilkinson-Seagull Purchase Agreement together with an Assignment 
of Wilkinson's seller's interest in said Purchase Agreement 
(R.48,49). It may be noted that the broadcasting equipment 
conveyed by Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson to Seagull had been pledged as 
security to United Bank to secure a loan in the amount of 
$90,000.00 which $90,000.00 was distributed as follows: $5,000.00 
to Mr. Wilkinson as down payment for the real property, $74,000.00 
distributed by United Bank, as escrow, to Mr. Wilkinson on the 
approval of the Cormnission of the transfer of the broadcast 
license from Mr. Wilkinson to Seagull, and the amount of $11,000.00 
as operating capital for Seagull (R.302). Both Mr. Sadler and 
Gardner personally guaranteed the United Bank loan to Seagull 
(R. 302) . 
On or about the 26th day of May, 1976, Mr. Wilkinson 
purportedly assigned his seller's interest in each of the 
agreements by and between Mr. Wilkinson and Seagull to the 
respondent herein, Mr. Tim Themy. 
Thereafter, Seagull transferred and assigned to Shirley 
K. Watson d/b/a Murray Broadcasting Company, the broadcasting 
equipment together with the subject broadcasting license. An 
appropriate assignment application was submitted to the 
Conrrnission and accepted for filing by the Cormnission on July 9, 
1976. Pursuant to 47 USCA Section 309 (b) (1), an a·pplication 
may not be granted earlier than thirty (30) days following the 
issuance of public notice of the acceptance of the C0Im11ission 
5 
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of the application for filing. This allows an interested 
party thirty (30) days in which to file objections to the 
proposed transfer or assignment. Respondent herein, Mr. Tim 
Themy, did file a Petition to Deny the assignment on November 
16, 1976, and although the petition was not timely filed, 
respondent's pleading was treated by the Commission as an ink 
objection to the application and considered on its merits (R.1! 
265). Notwithstanding respondent's objections, the assignment 
of the subject broadcasting license from Seagull to Shirley K. 
Watson d/b I a Murray Broadcasting Company was approved by the 
Cormnission on the 4th day of March, 1977 (R.267, 267A). 
Subsequently, Shirley K. Watson d/b/ a Murray Broadcast: 
Company transferred the broadcasting equipment and assigned t'.'.! 
subject broadcasting license to Murray Broadcasting Company,!: 
This assignment of the broadcasting license was approved by 
the Commission on the 14th day of June, 1977 (R.266). 
An application was submitted to the Commission on the 
31st day of May, 1977, for authority to relocate the broadcasc: 
site of the station from the facilities originally conveyed bv 
'.I 
Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson to Seagull to the station's present broacc, 
site located at 4874 South State Street, Murray, Utah. Temper' 
authority for the relocation was granted by the Commission on 
the 1st day of July, 1977. 
rantei 
On the 15th day of August, 1977, authority was g 
Of t he station f:: by the Commission to change the call letters 
Broadcast:· 
KMOR to KPRQ and the broadcasting license of Murray 
6 b 
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Company, Inc., was renewed by the Commission for a three year 
period on the 13th day of January, 1978. 
Presently, Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc. operates 
radio station KPRQ pursuant to a valid license duly approved 
and renewed by the Commission on a relocated broadcasting site 
and with independently obtained broadcasting equipment, and 
neither the real property nor the broadcast equipment originally 
conveyed by Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson to Seagull is occupied or utilized 
by Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc. 
Because of the nature of this proceeding, to wit: an 
appeal from the grant of a Summary Judgment, appellants respectfully 
submit that a brief outline of the pleadings would be beneficial 
to this Court. Respondent's Verified Complaint naming Seagull, 
Shirley K. Watson and United Bank, a Utah Corporation as party 
defendants, was initially filed on the 1st day of October, 1976 
(R.2-21). At that time, respondent also sought the appointment 
of a receiver (R.22). Answers to the Verified Complaint were 
duly filed by the defendants United Bank (R.32,33), Shirley K. 
Watson (R.36,37) and Seagull (R.40,41). Additionally, a Motion 
to Intervene and Answer was filed by Zions First National Bank 
(R.42-49) and this motion was granted on the 24th day of February, 
1977 (R. 55). 
Pursuant to the leave of court granted on the 21st day 
of July, 1977 (R.84), respondent filed an Amended Complaint naming 
Seagull, Shirley K. Watson, United Bank, Zions First National 
Bank and Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc., as party defendants 
7 
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(R. 70-80). By his Amended Complaint, respondent sought a 
judgment of forfeiture of Seagull and its successors in interes 
in and to the agreement relating to the real property (R. 72) o: 
in the al terna ti ve, for a judgment treating the Agreement, as 
a note and mortgage with foreclosure thereof (R. 73, 74). With 
respect to the Agreement relating to the broadcasting equipment 
and broadcasting license, respondent sought a declaratory judge: 
that plaintiff was the equitable owner of the broadcasting eq~'1 
and license (R. 75), or, in the alte1:native, for a judgment trq 
the Agreement relating to the broadcasting equipment: and licer' 
as a note and mortgage with foreclosure againft the same (R.76 
Additionally, plaintiff claimed a security interest in the 
broadcast equipment and license and, after alleging a delinque 
balance of $45,736.98, sought possession thereof pursuant to 
Article 9 of the Utah Cormnercial Code (R. 77). Finally, respor: 
sought relief pursuant to the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act 
(R.79). 
Answers to respondent's Amended Complaint were filed 
by the defendants Shirley K. Watson ancl Murray Broadcasting cc:t 
Inc. (R.87-90), Zions First National Bank (R.91-94), Seagull 
(R.99-101), and United Bank (R.130-133). 
On the 21st day of September, 1977, respondent fileda 
b . arguei Motion for Surmnary Judgment (R.134) with the same eing 
and taken under advisement by the Court on the 3rd day of ocr:: 
1977 (R.136). d f October . By Memorandum Decision under ate o 
for 51Jl]JlPO: 
1977 (R.158), the Court granted respondent's Motion 
8 e 
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Judgment and on the 2nd day of November, 1977, a formal 
Summary Judgment was entered (172,173). 
Appellants Seagull, Shirley K. Watson and Murray 
Broadcasting Company, Inc., petitioned the lower Court for a 
reformation of the Suilll!lary Judgment (R.174-178; R.181,182), and 
on the 5th day of January, 1978, an Order Denying Petition to 
Reform Memorandum Decision and SUilllllary Judgment was entered 
(R.191-193). 
The Notice of Appeal herein was filed on the 24th day 
of January, 1978 (R.202,203), and on the 6th day of March, 1978, 
respondent's Motion to Dismiss appellants' appeal was denied. 
Pursuant to leave of this Court granted April 17, 1978, 
appellants filed an Amended Notice of Appeal and an Amended 
Designation of Record on Appeal to include that certain Order 
Appointing Receiver Or In The Alternative, Setting Supersedeas 
Bond, entered in the above entitled matter on or about the 17th 
day of Mar ch , 1 9 7 8 ( R . 
On the 17th day of April, 1978, this Court continued 
in force and effect the stay against the Order Appointing Receiver 
Or In The Alternative, Setting Supersedeas Bond, conditioned on 
the lower court fixing an appropriate supersedeas bond. The 
hearing before the lower Court to establish an appropriate 
supersedeas bond is pending at the present time. However, the 
propriety of the lower Court's action in appointing a receiver 
with full authority to take possession of the real and personal 
property and the broadcasting license and sell or transfer the 
9 
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same together with the authority of the receiver to manage 
radio station KPRQ remain within the scope of this appeal 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE EXISTED 
GENUINE DISPUTES AS TO MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT 
A. A GENUINE DISPUTE EXISTED BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
AS TO WHETHER RESPONDENT WAS THE SUCCESSOR IN 
INTEREST OF MR. 0. J. WILKINSON IN AND TO THE 
TWO AGREEMENTS THAT CONSTITUTED THE SUBJECT MATTH 
OF RESPONDENT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
It is elementary that, "Rule 56, U.R.C.P., should not:' 
u~:ed where there are issues of fact in dispute". Hatch vs. 
Sugarhouse Finance Company, 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P2d 758 (1967) 
at 20 Utch 2d 157. 
In Holbrook Company vs. Adams, 542 P2d 191, this Court 
stated at 542 P2d 193: 
"It is not the purpose of the su=ary judgment 
procedure to judge the creditability of the averments 
of parties, or witnesses, or the weight of evid7nce. 
Neither is it to deny parties th£• right to a tna~ 
to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose.is 
to eliminate the time, trouble ancl expense of trial 
when upon any view taken of the facts as ass~rted by. 
the party ruled age inst, he would not be entitled 
to prevail. Only when it so appears , is the co~rt 
justified in refusing such a party the. opportunity de 
of presenting his evidence and attempting ~o pursua 
the fact trier to his views. Conversely, if there 
is any dispute as to any issue, material to the , 
settlement of the controversy, the summary judgmen-
should not be granted". 
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of Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not 
constitute a new announcement by this Court as to the rules 
governing disposition of proceedings filed pursuant to said 
rule, but merely constitutes a reiteration of the established 
guide lines. In re Williamses Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P2d 
683. This Court has further stated that a Summary Judgment 
is appropriate only where the favored party makes a showing which 
precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to the 
losing party. Tanner vs. Utah Pou~try and Farmers Co-op, 11 Utah 
2d 353, 359 P2d 18, and Bullock vs. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, 
Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P2d 559. 
On review, this Court is, " ... obliged to com<ider the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the (losing parties)". 
Whitman vs. W. T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P2d 918. 
When viewed against the stamlard of appellate review, 
it becomes apparent that respondent's standing as the proper 
party plaintiff was a material fact as to which there was a 
genuine dispute between the parties. By his Verified Complaint, 
respondent alleged that he had been assigned by agreement under 
date of May 26, 1976, the seller's interest in and to the two 
Purchase Agreements by and between O. J. Wilkinson and Seagull 
(R.2); and, this allegation was renewed by respondent in his 
Amended Complaint (R.71). Appellants Seagull, Shirley K. Watson 
and Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc. alleged that they were 
without sufficient information on which to form a belief as to 
che truthfulness of respondent's allegation and, accordingly, 
denied the same (R. 87; R. 99). 
11 
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Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
requires that "(e)very action shall be prosecuted in the name 
of the real party in interest." While an action may not be 
dismissed until a reasonable time has been allowed for ratifk· 
joinder or substitution, appellants submit that the standing 0: 
the plaintiff as the real party in interest or successor in 
interest to a contractural right or obligation constitutes a 
significant material fact that a dispute with respect thi,reto 
would preclude the grant of a Summary Judgment. In Disabled 
American Veterans vs. Hendrickson, 9 Utah 2d 152, 340 P2d 416, 
plaintiff alleged that it was a duly authorized state chapter 
of the Disabled American Veterans, a national organization, an: 
as such, was vested with the rights granted to that corporatio: 
By its answer, the defendant challenged plaintiff's capacity a; 
a corporation in its right to sue. In reiterating that Summar 
Judgment, " ... can properly be rendered against a defendant oni 
if, on the undisputed facts, the defendant has no valid defense 
(9 Utah 2d 154), this Court held that the issue presented a 
genuine dispu,te as to material issue of fact that precluded 
Summary Judgment. 
The materiality of this disputed issue of fact i; 
emphasized by the uncontested consideration that prior to the 
' ~ r: I 
purported assignment by Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson of his seller 5 •· 
· on in and to the two Purchase Agreements to respondent herein · 
May 26, 1976, Mr. Wilkinson had executed and delivered to Zioc 
· and cc First National Bank a Deed of Trust and Assignment in 
w' lkinso: 
real property and the Purchase Agreement between Mr. i 
12 
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and Seagull. Accordingly, as th{' same related to the real 
property and the Purchase Agreement with respect thereto, Mr. 
Wilkinson had no assignable interest in May of 1976. 
A further complication presented by this issue is 
wheth~r Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson retained an assignable interest in 
the agreement and remedies included therein, including forfeiture, 
relating to the broadcasting license after the transfer from 
Mr. Wilkinson to Seagull was approved by the Corrrrnission on the 
13th day of December, 1974. The Purchase Agreement relating to 
the broadcasting license specifically provided, " ... that consum-
mation of this deal shall be and is dependent upon the Buyer applying 
for and obtaining approval from the FCC of the transfer of all 
of seller's right, title, and interest in the FCC broadcast 
license granted to seller," (R.18), and the record is clear that 
Corrrrnission approval was granted(R.301). 
Respondent has and continues to misconstrue the nature 
of the broadcasting license duly issued and approved by the 
Corrrrnission. A license to broadcast is not a chattel or piece 
of personal property that may be bought and sold subject to a 
seller's security interest or lien. Rather, the utilization of 
the public airways is a privilege, the use of which is subject 
to the exclusive regulation and control of the Corrrrnission. 
This was recognized in American Broadcasting Company vs. F.C.C.' 
191 F2d 493 (Ct of App., District of Columbia Circuit 1951), 
wherein it was stated: 
13 
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','· .. it i~ well to emphasize certain fundamentals. 
the policy of ~he (Communications) Act is clear 
that no person is to have anything in the nature 
o~ a pr~perty right as a result of the grant of a 
license . F.C.C. vs. Sanders Brothers Radio 
Station. 309 U.S. 7i7D, 475 s.ct.693, 697, 84 
L Ed 869 II 
This was further illustrated in F. L. Crowder vs. F.C 
399 F2d 569 (Ct. of App. District of Columbia Circuit, 1968), 
wherein it is stated at 399 F2d 571: 
" ... a broadcast frequency is not a homestead which 
after five years belongs to the settler for whatever 
use he desires. Rather it belongs to the public 
who through the Commission awards its use to a 
license to operate consistent with the public 
interest." 
It is clear that when Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson conditionec 
consummation of the trans fer of the broadcasting license to 
Seagull on Connnission approval, Mr. Wilkinson relinquished, b•: 
operation of law, any security interest or lien in or to the 
broadcasting license. Having done so, Mr. Wilkinson could noc 
subsequently assign to respondent an interest that he did not 
have. 
On further consideration illustrating thi' impropriet' 
of allowing either Mr. Wilkinson or his purported successor ic 
the broadcarl interest to invoke a remedy of forfeiture against 
license is that under the subject agreement (R.15-21) an enfc: 
. t;' 
able forfeiture releases the seller from any and all obllga ·· 
" ... to convey said property ... " (R.17). In the context of th: 
proceeding, O. J. Wilkinson assigned and transferred the bro:. 





Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
When this approval was granted, the assignment and transfer were 
accomplished and Mr. Wilkinson retained no further obligation 
or interest to be conveyed and accordingly, could not assign an 
enforceable forfeiture remedy. 
Appellants respectfully submit that the issue relating 
to respondent as the real party in interest together with the 
issue of respondent's standing to obtain the relief requested 
in the respondent's Amended Complaint constituted genuine disputes 
as to material issues of fact that would in and of themselves 
preclude Summary Judgment against appellant. 
B. NEITHER RESPONDENT NOR HIS PREDECESSOR IN 
INTEREST PROPERLY INVOKED THE REMEDIAL 
PROVISIONS OF THE SUBJECT PURCHASE AGREEMENTS. 
The remedial provisions of both Purchase Agreements 
including the agreement relating to the broadcasting equipment 
and license, draw heavily in form and substance on the standard 
form Uniform Real Estate Contract. Each agreement provides for 
a ninety (90) day grace period (R.10; R.17) and three alternative 
remedies in the event of default, to wit: (1) Forfeiture if the 
buyer fails to remedy the purported default within five days 
after written notice from the seller; (2) Suit to recover 
delinquent installments, including costs and attorney fees; and 
(3) Upon written notice to the buyer, a treatment by the seller 
of the agreement as a note and mortgage and foreclosure thereon 
(R.10, 11; R.17). 
In this proceeding, the lower Court by summary Judgment 
declared that appellants had forfeited their interest in the 
15 
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real property, broadcasting equipment and other tangible perso: 
property and the broadcasting license (R.172,173). Appellants 
respectfully submit that the lower Court erred in declaring a 
forfeiture by appellants because a genuine dispute as to maten 
fact existed as to whether respondent or his predecessor in 
interest properly invoked the remedial requirements of the sub, 
agreements. 
There is no allegation in respondent's Amended Complai· 
(R. 70-80) that respondent gave prior written notice to appella: 
or any of them of an intent to declare a forfeiture. The only 
reference to a notice purportedly complying with the requiremec 
of each Purchase Agreement is that Notic·e served on Gardner or. 
the 4th day of September, 1975 (R. 358-362). However, after th; 
service of these documents and Gardner's departure for emplo~' 
in Wyoming, Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson, the seller and individual res:I 
for the service of the purported notices, represented and adv'.: 
Gardner that Seagull would go forward with the subject Purchas: 
Agreements. Accordingly, Gardner returned to the stat ion and· 
furthE;r notices were served by Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson. Based on· 
evidence, the lower Court should have found that a genuine di;: 
as to material issue of fact existed, i.e. whE<ther Mr· 0. J. 
Wilkinson by his conduct after the service of the purported 
notice, waived any con tr<· ctural right to declare or proceed w'. 
forfeiture without the giving of another notice to appellants 
1 . t while Additionally, respondent's Amended Comp ain • · 
. . d seagul' 
alleging respondent's prEdecessor in interest serve 
16 t 
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with notices of forfeiture, further alleges that respondent 
" ... has provided Seagull with written notice of (respondent's) 
intention to treat the Agreement (relating to the real property) 
as a note and mortgage and to foreclose the same". (R.72). This 
allegation by respondent to the effect that respondent elected 
to treat the agreement relating to the real property as a note 
and mortgage and foreclose the same after the service of the 
Notice relating to forfeiture, negates the prior forfeiture 
notice an<l a Summary Judgment of forfeiture is inappropriate 
because respondent has not complied with the Notice provisions 
required to invoke that remedy. 
The same is true of the agreement relating to the 
broadcasting equipment and license. The only notice referred to 
by respondent is that served by respondent's predecessor in 
interest in September'of 1974. The factual issue relating to 
a waiver of this notice by virtue of the subsequent conduct of 
Mr. 0. J. Wilkinson has been previously discussed and it is 
sufficient to note that appellants denied in their responsive 
pleadings the receipt of any notice by respondent or his predecessor 
in interest that would invoke the remedial provisions of the broad-
casting equipment and license agreement. 
After respondent's initial complaint (R.2-21) had been 
filed October 12, 1976 and the Amended Complaint (R.70-80) filed 
on the 13th day of July, 1977, respondent's legal counsel served 
Gardner with a letter under date of September l, 1977 and attach-
ments (R. ) . This letter attempted to invoke, on respondent's 
17 
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behalf, the forfeiture provisions of the subject agreements, 
however, the same is totally defective for several reasons, 
including the following: (1) The purported notice was given 
after the institution of the proceedings in the lower Court 
wherein respondent sought forfeiture or, in the alternative, 
foreclosure of mortgage; (2) The purported notice is addresse.: 
to Seagull and there is no verification of service on either :;:1 
or Murray Broadcasting Co., Inc.; (3) The purported notice fa:. 
to advise the purchaser ttat unless the alleged default is rec:1 
within five (5) days, the sellEr intends to be released from 
all obligations to convey the property ancl that all previous i:1 
will be forfeited; (L.) The purported notice fails to advise tn: 
the purchaser has become a tenant at will of the seller; and, 
(5) The purported notice reconfirms the earlier notice allegec. 
given by respondent tc treat the agreements as a mortgage and 
foreclose therEon. For these reasons, the letter of Septembe: 
1977, may not be used by respondent to pull himself by his 01~ 
bootstraps into compliance with the conditions precedent tot'• 
invocation of the remedy of forfeiture. As to a foreclosure 
proceeding, the record is clear that no timely notice was se:• 
on appellants prior to the institution of these proceedings. 
It is clear that a genuine dispute as to a material'' 
' wi· th the remedial of fact relating to respondent s compliance 
the par:: 
conditiom. of the Purchase Agreements existed between 
29 urah · As stated in Russell vs. Park City Utah Corporation, 
184, 506 P2d 1274 (1973) of 506 P2d 1276: 
1 A 
-----
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:1 
:J 
" ... one who seeks to invoke a forfeiture must 
strictly comply with the prerequisites thereof 
because forfeitures are not favored in the law. 
It should be obvious that there is a disputed 
material issue upon which the defendant is entitled 
to a trial." 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRONEOUSLY FORFEITED APPELLANTS' 
INTEREST IN AND TO THE PRIOR PAYMENTS MADE PURSUANT 
TO THE PURCHASE AGREEMENTS AND THIS ENFORCEMENT 
AGAINST APPELLANTS CONSTITUTED AN UNCONSCIONABLE 
PENALTY. 
Respondent freely admits that appellants had paid to 
respondent's predecessor in interest the sumo~ $5,000.00 against 
the real property agreement (R.73) together with the sum of 
$74,000.00 against the broadcasting equipment and license 
agreement (R.74). However, by its Surmnary Judgment, the lower 
Court forfeited appellants' interest in and to all amounts 
previously paid. 
A contractural provision providing for the seller's 
retention of previously paid amounts may be enforceable as 
liquidated damages or equitably unenforceable as a penalty depending 
on whether the forfeited amount is reasonably related to the actual 
damages sustained by the aggrieved party. 
This Court stated in Russell vs. Ogden Union Ry. and 
~ot Company, 122 Utah 107, 247 P2d 257 (1952) at 247 P2d 263: 
"It is well settleod that a provision in a 7ontract 
between private individuals for a penalty in case 
of a breach of such contract is unenforceable in 
the courts". 
h lt . w;ll not be enforced Applying the principle t at pena ies ~ 
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this Court, in Perkins et al vs. Spencer et al, 121 Utah 468, 
243 P2d 446 (1952), stated at 121 Utah 474, 475: 
"It will be observed that in all cases where the 
~tipulation for liquidated damages was enforced 
it bore some reasonable relation to the actual 
damages which could reasonably be anticipated at 
the time the contract was made and was not a 
forfeiture which would allow an unconscionable 
and exorbitant recovery. 
" ... where enforcement of the forfeiture provision 
would allow an unconscionable and exorbitant recover•: 
bearing no reasonable relationship to the actual , 
damages suffered, we have uniformly held it to be 
very unenforceable." 
The agreement relating to the broadcasting equipment 
and broadcast license provided that the first monthly installi: 
payment after the payment of the amount of $74,000.00 was rek 
and paid to Mr. Wilkinson by the escrow after Commission appro 
of the subject transfer, would be the first day of the sixth 
month following Conunission approval (R.15). Accordingly, the 
first installment was due on June 1, 1975; however, the agree::I 
further provided for a ninety (90) day grace period within wh:: 
payment could be made after the same became due (R.17). On 
i 
September 4, 1975, five days after the expiration of the gracei 
period, Mr. Wilkinson served Seagull with the Notice purportin· 
(R l' to invoke the forfeiture remedy of the subject agreement ·, 
The existence of a genuine dispute 
relating to whether Mr. Wilkinson's 
. 1 . e of fac as to materia issu 
·ved · 
subsequent conduct wai 
negated the notice of September 4, 1975, has been previouslY, 
h inec~ discussed and its present relevance is to illustrate t e 
20 b 
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of declaring a forfeiture of $74,000.00 by Seagull and its 
successors in interest for a five day delinquency. 
This Court may review both the facts and the law in 
equity proceedings. Article VII, Section 9 of the Constitution 
of the State of Utah. When so reviewed, it is clear that a 
genuine dispute exists as to material issue of fact so as to 
preclude a sununary judgment that forfeits appellants' prior 
payments to respondent and his predecessor in interest. 
POINT III 
THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT DECLARING A FORFEITURE OF 
APPELLANTS' INTEREST IN AND TO THE BROADCASTING 
LICENSE EXCEEDS THE SCOPE OF RELIEF DEMANDED IN 
RESPONDENT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
Respondent's Amended Complaint, while seeking a forfeiture 
and/or mortgage foreclosure of the agreement relating to the real 
property (R. 71-74), trac~s a different course with respect to 
the agreement relating to the broadcasting equipment and broadcast 
license. With respect to the second agreement, respondent demands 
"· .. a declaratory injunction determining plaintiff to be the 
equitable owner of the license and equipment ... " and further, the 
"· .. issuance of a mandatory injunction ... requiring defendants to 
assist plaintiff in obtaining transfer of the F.C.C. license into 
plaintiff's name" (R. 75); or, alternatively, for a judgment 
treatment the agreement as a note and mortgage and foreclosing 
the same (R. 76, 77); or, in the alternative, a judgment under 
Article IX of the Utah Conunercial Code allowing respondent 
~ssession of the property, including the broadcasting license, 
~d the sale thereof (R.77,78); or, in the alternative, an action 
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under the Utah Fraudulent Conveyance Act (R.79). 
Appellants submit that the Summary Judgment entered 
by the lower Court exceeded the scope of the alternative relfr 
sought by the respondent in his Amended Complaint to the surpr: 
and prejudice of appellants. In Taylor vs. E .M. Royle Corp., 
1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P2d 279 (1953), this Court stated at 264 Pi. 
280: 
"It is true that our new rules should be 'liberallv 
construed' to secure a 'just·h'c7<determination of · 
every action' , but they do not represent a one way 
street down which but one litigant may travel. The 
rules allow locomotion in both directions by all 
interested travelers. They allow plaintiffs con-
siderable latitude in pleading and proof, to the 
point where some people have expressed the opinion 
that careless legal craftsmanship has been invited 
rather than discouraged. Be that as it may, a 
defendant must be extended every reasonc:,ble opportuni 
to prepare his case and to meet an adversary's claim: 
Also he must be protected against surprise and be 
assured equal opportunity and facility to present anc 
prove counter contentions, --else unilateral justice 
and injustice would result sufficient to raise seri~. 
doubts as to constitutional due process guarantees. 
This proceeding does not present a situation where a 
party has been allowed to amend his pleadings to conform tot: 
proof presented at a trial on the merits, rather, it is a 
sunnnary judgment based on the pleadings. In this latter sitU' 1 
d · ot''
1 
the judgment should be within the scope of the plea ings; ... 
never) 
the judgment may be predicated on an issue a party was 
· · f h. possi.ble adversity,RulE upon to meet. In recognition o t is 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically limits the 
·re·· judgment to the, " ... pleadings, depositions, answers to in-· 
tories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavit; 
22 
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It is clear that with respect to the agreement relating 
to the broadcasting equipment and broadcasting license, appellants 
met and defended the issues as raised by respondent's Amended 
Complaint. By his Third Claim for Relief respondent sought a 
declaratory injunction determining respondent to be the equitable 
owner of the broadcast license and requiring appellants to assist 
respondent in obtaining Commission approval of a transfer of the 
license of appellants to respondent (R. 75). 
In Radio Station WOW, Inc. vs. Johnson, 325 US 120, 
89 L Ed 2092, The United States Supreme Court addressed itself 
to the issue of the power of a state to adjudicate conflicting 
claims to property used by a licensed radio station. The Supreme 
Court of the State of Nebraska had voided a lease of the physical 
properties utilized by radio station on the grr·unds of fraud and 
ordered the parties, "to do all things necessary" to secure a 
return of the broadcast license to the defauded party. The 
United States Supreme Court concluded at 89 L Ed 2101: 
" ... we think the court went outside its bounds when 
it ordered the parties 'to do all things necessary' 
to secure a return of the license". 
It was further noted at 89 L Ed 2102: 
"We think that State power is amply respecte~ ~f 
it is qualified merely to the exten~ of reguiring 
it to uphold execution of that por~ion of its ~ecree 
requiring a retransfer of the physical.properties. 
until steps are ordered to be taken, wit~ all delibe7ate 
speed, to enable to Commission to deal with new appli-
cation in connection with the station." 
Subsequent holdings from other jurisdictions recognize 
the separability of the jurisdiction of the state court to deal 
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with the physical properties of the broadcast station as 
distinquished from the broadcasting license issued by the 
Commission to operate such a station. In Big League Broadcas: 
ing Company vs. Shedd-Agard Broadcasting, Inc. and Womack, L 
So. 2d 247 (La. App., 1975), the court stated: 
"We agree with that portion of the trial judges 
reasoning recognizing that only the F.C.C. could 
determine the validity of the license trc.nsfer 
and that state courts are without jurisdiction in 
that respect. However ... the F. C. C. 's jurisdiction 
is limited merely to control of the license and ... 
there can be a separation of the license from the 
facility which that license gives one the privilege 
of operating." 
Additionally, in Southern Broadcasting CorporaEionvs 
Carlson, 197 La. 823, 175 So. 587 (1937), the court stated: 
"Of course, a state court could not, without approval 
of the Communication Commission, order a transfer of 
a license, or of any right granted thereunder." 
It is well established that a state court may not 
interfere with or compel the transfer of a duly issued and 
approved broadcasting license and respondent's efforts to 
accomplish this objective by a declaratory judgment were appr: 
priately met and countered by appellants. However, the entr: 
of the Summary Judgment declaring appellants' interest in anc 
to the broadcasting equipment and broadcast license forfeiteC 
erroneously allowed respondent to accomplish indirectly what' 
na: 
could not accomplish directly to the prejudice of the appe 
Had respondent pleaded a cause of action for forfeiture of
0 
l ,. 
agreement re la tint; to the equipment and license, appel an,, 
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and would have properly presented their position to the lower 
Court. 
The grant of a sunnnary judgment that exceeded the scope 
of the pleadings prejudically denied appellants the opportunity 
to properly prepare and present their defenses and allowed a 
disposition of the case on an issue defendants were never called 
upon to meet. Taylor vs. E. M. Royle Corp. supra. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER, OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, FOR SETTING OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND. 
By its Order Appointing Receiver or in the Alternative 
Setting Supersedeas Bond, under date of March 16, 1978, the lower 
Court appointed a receiv~r of the real and persnonal property and 
the broadcasting license that constituted the subject matter of 
the proceeding. Additionally, the order authorized the receiver 
to sell said propr:rty, seek Connnission approval for the retransfer 
of the broadcasting license from Murray Broadcasting Company, 
Inc. to respondent or a third party purchaser obtained by the 
receiver and, aut:horized the receiver to take over the management 
of radio station KPRQ. 
As previously noted, the real property and broadcast 
equipment originally transferred by 0. J. Wilkinson to Seagull 
are no longer being occupied or utilized by th~' present broadcast-
ing license operator, Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc. Accordingly, 
~e appointment of a receiver with respect to these properties 
would be unnecessary and inappropriate. Respondent candidly concedes 
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that: 
" ( t) he reason why (respondent) seeks this receivershi: 
is that (respondent) has been informed by co-counsel 
in Washington D.C. specializing in FCC practice th~ 
FCC rules do not permit direct transfer of the FCC 
license to plaintiff, and that such transfer can onl:: 
be accomplished by means of the appointment of a 
receiver." (R.215). 
Respondent predicated the appointment of a receiver i: 
Rule 66 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides 
in part: 
"(a) receiver may be appointed by the court in which 
an action is pending or has passed to judgment: 
* * * 
"(3) After judgment, to carry the judgment into 
effect." 
However, it is clear that with respect to the real pF 
and broadcasting equipment, a receiver was not necessary to c0: 
the judgment into effect because the real property is no long: 
occupied by appellants and the broadcasting equipment is w 
longer utilized by appellants. As the same relates to the 
broadcasting license, a receiver is not necessary to carry '.ht 
summary judgment of forfeiture into effect because respondent 
in his own name and on his own behalf, may apply to the Cammi' 
for retransfer of the subject broadcasting license without t[., 
intervention of a third party receiver. For this reason aloni 
the appointment of a post judgment receiver is not sanctioned 
practical necessity or the applicable rules of civil procedur: 
Additionally, the Order Appointing Receiver or 
Al d f exceeds the sc0P' ternative, Setting Supersedeas Bon , ar 
the summary judgment of forfeiture in that the same allows a; .. 
26 , 
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authorizes the receiver to assume the control and management of 
radio station KPRQ. There is no arguable premise on which it 
may be argued that control and management of the radio station 
itself is necessary to effectuate the sunnnary judgment of 
forfeiture. Respondent may apply to the Commission for approval 
of an involuntary transfer of the broadcasting license from 
Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc. to respondent without the 
necessity of assuming present control and management of the radio 
station. The operation of the station is pursuant to Commission 
rules and regulations and violative conduct by the license holder 
would render the license subject to revocation by the Commission. 
See 47 USCA, Section 312. There is nothing in the r~cord before 
this Court to indicate or i~ply that continued management of the 
station by Murray Broadcasting Company, Inc. would jeopardize or 
impair respondent's position and to now allow respondent the 
operation and management of the station would far exceed the 
scope of the summary judgment presently under appeal. 
One final observation must be noted with respect to the 
Order Appointing Receiver or in the Alternative, Setting S~persedeas 
Bond. While it appears that a state court may adjudicate certain 
issues of private dispute relating to the physical properties of 
an entity controled and licensed by the Commission, it is without 
authority to invalidate an operating license or compel execution 
against the same. Radio Station WOW, Inc. vs. Johnson, supra. 
The accomodation between the power of a state court as 
against the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission, was further 
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defined in RCA Communications, Inc. vs. Patchogue Broadcastin; 
Company, 198 NYS 2d 459, reversed on other grounds at 204 ms 
2d 900, as: 
" ... an accomodation between a State and Federal 
authority under which the State courts decree would 
remain unexecuted until the license transfer is 
properly accomplished, thus leaving with the State 
the power to pass upon State issues involved in 
Federal litigation without intruding on the Federal 
issues." 
It is well established that state court may not inter'., 
with or compel the transfer of a duly issued and approved 
broadcasting license or authorize execution against the same, 
and the lower Court improperly intruded into the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants respectfully submit that the lower Court 
erred in granting summary judgment of forfeiture ag<,inst 
appellants, and that the above entitled matter should be 
remanded to the District Court of the Third Judicial Distric'. 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, for a full trial 
on the merits. 
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of July, 1978. 
GARY A. FRANK uli 
Attorney for Appellants, Seag 
Enterprises, Inc. , Shirley ~­
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